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Abstract 
The article first reviews the charge scheme used to finance the airport infrastructure in Norway. Then 
an econometric approach is taken using empirical data for production and costs from 2007 to 2009 in 
order to derive long-run marginal costs for passengers and air traffic movements at Norwegian 
airports using panel data analysis. The marginal costs are then applied as the basis for a revised 
airport charge scheme designed to meet the principle of maximizing social benefits. The results 
suggest that there should be a shift towards a relatively higher charge for passengers compared to air 
traffic movements. 
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1. Introduction  
Airport infrastructure is, in most countries, financed by airport charges put on the services produced 
at the airport, together with revenues from commercial activities (Losada et al., 2012). The 
international air transport organizations aim for standardization of airport charges (Martin-Cejas, 
1997) and ICAO (2009) has a general policy stating that charges, amongst other things, should be 
based on costs and also be non-discriminatory. Most airports charge both passengers (PAX) and air 
traffic movements (ATM), but there are variations with respect to the distribution of charges 
between PAX and ATM, both between countries and type of airport ownership.  
Most Norwegian airports are operated by the state-owned company Avinor (see e.g. Lian, 2010) 
according to commercial principles. The network does not in total require state subsidies, but there is 
quite substantial cross-subsidization between the largest airports and those located in rural areas. 
Total operating costs vary considerably between the airports, due to different size and amount of 
traffic, and so does their cost efficiency (see e.g. GAP, 2012).  
Many earlier studies of costs in airport operations have focused on analyzing efficiency and 
economies of scale (e.g. Martín et al., 2011; Pels et al., 2003). However, the aim of this article is to 
analyze the Norwegian airports’ costs structure, using panel data models and subsequently derive 
the marginal cost of serving passengers and airplanes. The new panel data estimates enable better 
estimates of long-run marginal costs which, according to the social-welfare maximization principles 
(see e.g. Button, 2010), should be used as the basis for the national fare scheme. Taking the marginal 
cost estimations as a starting point, the article suggests a revised scheme for aviation charges 
designed according to the principles of welfare economics. The study is, in contrast to most other 
analyses of costs carried out in the transport industry, not an efficiency study, but rather focuses on 
providing new and better estimates on the actual costs of producing the current transport services. 
The article first provides a brief presentation of the Norwegian airport infrastructure with special 
focus on how it is currently financed in Section 2. Then, Section 3 presents an econometric model 
suitable for studying long-run marginal costs at Norwegian airports using panel data analysis. Next, 
Section 4 gives details about the data set, presents model results and derives marginal costs for PAX 
and ATM. The results are applied in new schemes for airport charges in Section 5 where the cost of 
raising public funds also is taken into account. Finally, possible implications for air transport 
companies, passengers and the authorities by implementing these airport charges are briefly 
discussed in Section 6.  
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2. Norwegian Airport Network and Airport Charges  
2.1 The Norwegian Airport Structure 
Today Norway is amongst the countries in Europe with the highest air transport dependence 
(Williams et al., 2007). While Norway in 2003 had a domestic air trip rate per capita of 2.27, most 
European countries had less than one third of this value. Moreover, Williams et al. (2007) show that 
Norway has the highest number of commercial airports with short runways (< 1 000 m) in Europe.1 
Many of these airports have low traffic and are located in areas which can be classified as peripheral 
(Kjærland and Mathisen, 2012).  
Consequently, in order to maintain satisfying provision of routes, the Norwegian Ministry of 
Transport and Communications procures air transport services from many of these airports through a 
public service obligation (PSO) system. Norway is, according to the European Commission (2009), a 
dominating ‘PSO-country’ in Europe holding nearly 20 % of all restricted PSO-routes. In 2009 the 
government used about NOK 574 million to subsidize PSO-operations to and from these airports (St. 
prp. 42, 2008-2009). The subsidized contracts are awarded as net contracts using competitive 
tendering every fourth or fifth year.2 The PSO regulations give the winning operator exclusive rights 
to operate the defined routes with a determined frequency, size of aircraft, maximum fare level, and 
social discounts. In 2013 almost all Norwegian PSO-routes are operated by Widerøes, the largest 
regional airline company in Scandinavia. 
The state, through the wholly owned company Avinor, owns and operates 46 airports throughout 
Norway with a total annual traffic of about 44 million passengers (PAX) in 2012 (Avinor, 2013). Avinor 
organizes the airports into three groups in which the main airport of Norway (OSL), located near the 
capital city Oslo, makes up the first ‘group’, the three other large airports located near the cities of 
Bergen, Stavanger and Trondheim make up the second group and the remaining 42 airports make up 
the third group as illustrated in Figure 1. In 2012 OSL had 22 million terminal passengers, the second 
group an average of 4.7 million terminal passengers, and the third group an average of 0.26 million 
terminal passengers. The main section of the third group consists of 29 local airports characterized 
by particularly low traffic (68000 terminal passengers on average in 2012). At these airports virtually 
all passenger traffic is subject to PSO. The remaining regional airports are located in more densely 
populated areas and air traffic is based on routes operated on a commercial basis.  
                                                          
1 Short Take-Off and Landing (STOL) planes such as Bombardier Dash-8 100 (or DHC-8) operate on local airports 
with runways as short as 800 meters. Local airports with sufficiently long runways are operated by jet planes. 
2 In the southern part of Norway the contract length is four years while it is five years in Northern Norway (see 
e.g. Kjærland and Mathisen, 2012). 
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Figure 1. Norwegian airports owned by Avinor (Source: Avinor). 
 
However, the road infrastructure has improved since the airports were built about 40 years ago 
(Mathisen and Solvoll, 2012), and there is an increasing leak of passengers to the larger airports in 
the network where commercial routes are operated by jet planes (Lian and Rønnevik, 2011). This 
development has revitalized the issue of reconsidering the whole structure of the regional airport 
network in Norway. For further details regarding the airport network in Norway see e.g. Lian (2010).   
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2.2 Current Airport Charges   
The airport charges imposed on air traffic are made up of five elements;3 take-off charge, passenger 
charge, security charge, TNC (Terminal Navigation Charge) and en-route charge. 4 Security charge, 
TNC and en-route charge are set to cover Avinors’ costs. The two remaining categories, take-off 
charge and passenger charge, which are the focus of this study, are set by Avinor according to 
directions from The Norwegian Ministry of Transport and Communication. Avinor also generates 
revenues indirectly related to air transport from commercial activities such as rent from shops and 
tax-free sales and parking. Prices for commercial activities are determined by Avinor. Total revenues 
for all airports are almost evenly distributed between PAX and ATM charges, on the one hand, and 
commercial activities on the other hand.    
The basis for this study is the airport charge system in 2009 forming the reference for all comparisons 
between new and old charges. Passengers were charged NOK 36 5 and NOK 59 for domestic and 
international flights, respectively. Air traffic movements were charged at a rate of NOK 96 per tonne 
according to the aircrafts’ maximum take-off weight (MTOW). For particularly large aircraft the 
charge is reduced to NOK 48 for each tonne exceeding 100. Consequently, an aircraft with a MTOW 
of 70 tonnes had to pay a take-off charge of about NOK 6700. According to the accounting figures for 
Avinor airports there was a total of 35.8 million PAX and 596 000 ATM in 2009 generating revenues 
of NOK 833 million and NOK 1280 million, respectively. This gives NOK 23 per PAX and NOK 2148 per 
ATM on average, (the figures can be doubled since a departure and arrival is charged only once). The 
charges were updated in 2010 to match the increase in costs and the entire scheme for ATM was 
then revised in 2011. The charges in NOK for the last three years are shown in Table 1. These figures 
do, however, not fully reflect the actual charges, since the airport owner in some situations 
introduces discounts in order to stimulate demand.6  
 
 
                                                          
3 All taxes are charged once per trip. A trip (without transfer) includes two flight movements and visits at 
terminals both at departure and landing. It is however, uncommon to charge these services separately for the 
origin and destination airports. 
4 The en-route charge is set to meet the cost generated by the air space surveillance services provided by the 
control centrals of Avinor. The TNC was introduced in 2011 to cover the control tower operating costs and is 
designed as a concavely increasing function of airplane weight (MTOW). Earlier, this charge was included in the 
take-off charge. The charges for security, tower services and en-route can be changed, if costs or traffic amount 
changes.  
5 € 1 ≈ NOK 8.  
6 A number of smaller airports operate a 30% discount on the take-off charge. Additionally, there is a start-up 
discount for the first few years of operation for newly established routes.  
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Table 1. Aviation charges on Norwegian airports owned by Avinor. 
Charges (in NOK) 2011 2012 2013 
Take-off Charge per ton MTOW a        
- tons 4-75 69 70 67 
- tons 76-150 34.5 35 33,5 
- tons > 151 14 14 13,4 
Passenger charge domestic flights 44 46 47 
Passenger charge international flights 59 60 61 
Security charge  58 47 55 
Terminal Navigation Charge (TNC per service unit) b  1912 1857 1609 
En-route charge c 530.04 475.06 430.28 
a From 2011, take-off charge is not payable for the first 6 tons of aircraft weight of more than 8 tons, with the 
exception of cargo flights who pay 70 NOK/ton for the first 6 tons of aircraft weight. 
b The number of service units for terminal charge is calculated according to the following formula: (MTOW in 
tons/50)^0.9). 
c The en-route charge is billed and collected by Eurocontrol.  
 
3. The Model  
Airport charges are vital for the financing of airport infrastructure and make up a considerable part of 
operating costs for airliners. These charges to finance airport infrastructure should, from a welfare 
economic point of view, be set to reflect the costs imposed by the activities. 
 
3.1 Previous Costs Studies 
An important basis for the analysis of airports’ costs is to define which services are provided by an 
airport and how they can be measured. Common production measures to assess the activity at an 
airport are the number of passengers (PAX), air traffic movements (ATM), work load units (WLU) and 
commercial revenues, while the size (or capacity) is often measured by runway length, number of 
runways, terminal area (square meters), number of gates, etc. (see e.g. Martín and Voltes-Dorta, 
2011). Moreover, Link et al. (2009) successfully applied labour as input in cost analyses of airport 
operations.   
One should, however, be aware that the choice of production measure and model formulation will 
influence the cost estimates. A comparison of cost estimates using different production measures is 
given by Martín and Voltes-Dorta (2008) revealing large differences in the estimated marginal costs, 
depending on model specification. External costs of air transport such as noise, pollution and delays 
can be internalized in order to make estimations of social marginal costs (see e.g. Santos and Robin, 
2010). 
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The most central production measures when studying airports are PAX and ATM. However, a 
potential problem for econometric analyses is that these two explanatory factors are highly 
correlated; when PAX increases the number of ATM will also increase in order to meet the increased 
demand, and vice versa. A way to avoid this problem is to use the above mentioned WLU-measure in 
which each passenger is for example assumed as weighing 100 kg. This production measure has, 
however, shown to be imprecise and vague, and is therefore rarely used in recent studies (Martín 
and Voltes-Dorta, 2011).  
An example of marginal cost estimation in Scandinavia was carried out by Carlsson (2003) using an 
exponential model with the number of passengers as the only independent variable, explaining 
about 96% of the variation in costs between airports. Mathisen et al. (2012) used both PAX and ATM 
in a model estimating the marginal costs of airport operations in Norway. Morgado and Macao 
(2012) estimated marginal costs at Portuguese airports and used these to suggest new charges. The 
importance of distinguishing between long-run and short-run marginal costs was addressed by 
Morrison (1983) who concluded that investment levels at a number of US airports were inefficient 
when considering capacity problems. When aiming to meet revenue restrictions, the Ramsey-rule 
has been applied by Martin-Cejas (1997) and Hakimov and Scholz (2010) to design charge schemes 
based on marginal cost estimates for Spanish and German airports, respectively.  
 
3.2 The Applied Cost Model 
The cost function applied in this study is an additive multiproduct specification relatively similar to 
the linear function presented by Mathisen et al. (2012). As mentioned in Section 3.1, a potential 
problem is that the number of passengers (PAX) and air traffic movements (ATM) are closely 
correlated. In order to reduce multi-correlation the independent variable ATM is processed both by 
the use of deviation from mean transformation and logarithmic transformation. This function was 
chosen after having assessed a number of specifications and transformations of the variables. 
Following the principle of parsimony (see. e.g. Link et al., 2009), the chosen model has properties in 
accordance with reasonable a-priori assumptions regarding the cost structure at Norwegian airports. 
For example, this type of specification implies that the marginal cost for an ATM is independent of 
PAX at the airport and vice versa.  
In a review of econometric analyses of costs at airports, Martín and Voltes-Dorta (2011) show that 
Cobb-Douglas and translog specifications have been frequently used. Even if a linear specification is 
less flexible than it often provides a good approximation for more advanced models (see e.g. Pels 
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and Rietveld, 2008). Moreover, the results from linear models are easy to interpret and are well-
suited for the purpose of the article since they can be applied directly as marginal cost estimates.  
An econometric approach using a model including the metric production measures number of 
passengers (PAX) and air traffic movements (ATM)7 as independent variables is applied to study the 
costs structure at Norwegian airports. The applied model, which is the basis for the panel data study, 
is presented in equation (1) to estimate costs at airport i in year t. It is clear from (1) that the 
marginal cost with respect to 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 = 𝑃𝑃1 is 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 𝜕𝜕𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃⁄ = 𝛽𝛽1. Since it is reasonable to consider the 
mean value, 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴������𝑡𝑡, as a relatively constant variable, the marginal cost for 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 is 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 𝜕𝜕𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴⁄ ≈
𝛽𝛽2/𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴. Since 𝐷𝐷1𝑖𝑖 is an imprecise and weak indication of capacity, the estimates can be interpreted 
as long-run. 8 
(1)  𝜕𝜕𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑃𝑃1𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑃𝑃2𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐷𝐷1𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4𝐷𝐷2𝑖𝑖 + 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡   
where 𝛽𝛽0,𝛽𝛽1,𝛽𝛽2,𝛽𝛽3,𝛽𝛽4 > 0 and 𝑃𝑃2𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 − 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴������𝑡𝑡 
The cost function in (1) estimates the total operating costs measured in Norwegian currency (NOK) at 
the 2009 price level for airport 𝑖𝑖 at time 𝑡𝑡, (𝜕𝜕𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) where the subscript 𝑖𝑖 denotes the cross-section 
dimension and 𝑡𝑡 denotes the time-series dimension. The intercept term 𝛽𝛽0 is fixed and thereby 
independent of both time and airport. The accounting figures are reported by Avinor and include all 
costs at the airport except security which is an outsourced service and covered by a separate charge. 
Regarding the independent variables, 𝑃𝑃1𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 and 𝑃𝑃2𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 are observable time-varying factors represented 
by deviation from annual mean for 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 and 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 as defined in (1). PAX is defined as the number of 
terminal passengers (sum of arrival and departure and transfer) at both route and charter flights and 
ATM is the sum of arrival and departure flights, including both route and charter categories. The 
dummy variable 𝐷𝐷1𝑖𝑖 is defined as 0 if the airport is classified as category 1 or 2, else 𝐷𝐷1𝑖𝑖 = 1.9 This 
follows the BSL E 3-2 categorization which mainly separates airports with runways shorter than 1199 
meters (𝐷𝐷1𝑖𝑖 = 0) from larger airports and, broadly speaking, corresponds with the group of local 
airports defined in Section 2.1. This separation is important since runways shorter than 1199 meters 
                                                          
7 There are strong indications that the part of the charge scheme related to ATM should be separated in one 
part depending on airplane weight with another part being independent of airplane weight (see e.g. Graham, 
2008). This is considered by Martín and Voltes-Dorta (2008) by introducing a ln-transformed measure of ATM 
adjusted for average maximum take-off weight (MTOW) for the planes using the airport. This measure is, 
however, not applied in (1).  
8 See the literature dating back to e.g. Walters (1965) for a further discussion of the application of marginal cost 
concepts with different time-horizons in transport. 
9 This refers to the size of the airport according to the categories ranging from 1 (small) to 4 (large) following 
the regulations on the design of large airports (BSL E 3-2) defined by The Norwegian Ministry of Transport and 
Communication (2006). Generally, the infrastructure requirements increase substantially for higher categories 
which again increase both investments and operation costs. The difference between the categories is most 
easily seen by the runway length and safety zones. 
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are not suited for jet planes. The dummy variable 𝐷𝐷2𝑖𝑖 is defined as 1 if the observation relates to the 
main national airport OSL which is considerably larger than all other airports in the network, 
otherwise  𝐷𝐷2𝑖𝑖 = 0. Both dummy variables are observable time-invariant factors.  
A-priori assumptions are that all 𝛽𝛽-parameters are positive, implying that all factors are positively 
correlated with costs. Furthermore, the disturbance term 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is divided between the 
unobservable airport-specific effect, 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖, and the remainder of the disturbance, 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡. 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 is time-
invariant and accounts for the airports’ unobserved characteristics, whereas the remainder of the 
disturbance, 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡, varies with companies and time and can be thought of as the usual disturbance term 
in the regression (see e.g. Wooldridge, 2006).  
 
3.3 Panel Data Analysis 
A pooled regression of equation (1) could offer unbiased results if the unobserved effects, 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 are 
uncorrelated with the regressors, but would not make best use of the data. In the analysis, attention 
will be directed at how the panel data model can make better use of the data compared to pooled 
regression. When considering both within-, and between-group variation, the best unbiased 
estimation of equation (1) can be derived using random effects estimation with basis in the 
Generalized Least Squares (GLS) model. The random effects (GLS) model assumes the properties of 
data being sampled randomly to construct a more efficient estimator, i.e. individual effects are 
uncorrelated with the regressors in all time periods, 𝜕𝜕𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣(𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃1𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 ,𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖) = 0. In the random effects 
model derived in equation (2), the weight given to between-group variation is defined by theta, 𝜃𝜃 =1 −� 𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀2
𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀
2+𝑇𝑇𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢
2 where 𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀2 = 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣(𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡), 𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢2 = 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣(𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖) and 𝐴𝐴 is time periods (e.g. Adkins and Hill, 2011). 
Theta (𝜃𝜃)  is defined to be a value between 0 and 1. If theta is close to 0, the unobserved effect is 
relatively unimportant and the within and between variation should be given equal weight. This 
makes random effects estimates equal to pooled OLS estimates. A theta value close to 1 indicates 
that the random effects estimates are equal to the within-group estimates (Wooldridge, 2006). 
(2) 𝜕𝜕𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 − 𝜃𝜃𝜕𝜕?̅?𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0(1 − 𝜃𝜃) + 𝛽𝛽1(𝑃𝑃1𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 − 𝜃𝜃𝑃𝑃�1𝑡𝑡) + 𝛽𝛽2(𝑃𝑃2𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 − 𝜃𝜃𝑃𝑃�2𝑡𝑡) + 𝛽𝛽3(1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝐷𝐷1𝑖𝑖 +
β4(1 − θ)D2i + (vit − θv�it) 
The relatively strict assumptions imply that the model should be thoroughly tested to assess whether 
the random effects (GLS) can be applied. The Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier test is designed to 
test if the random effects method is suited for analysing the data set. If the null hypothesis of zero 
variance in the groups is not rejected, the pooled regression model is more appropriate than the 
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random effects model. Whether the random effects estimators are unbiased is most commonly 
assessed using the Hausman test comparing the estimated coefficients of the within-group with the 
random effects models. Random effects is consistent and should be used only if the two models do 
not differ significantly (Baltagi, 2005).  
 
4. Estimation results  
4.1 Available Data 
All airports are obliged to report detailed accounting and traffic information to the fully state-owned 
company Avinor. Accounting figures are adjusted to a 2009 price level using the consumer price 
index provided by Statistics Norway (2013). The cost variable includes depreciation and excludes 
security and rents paid by commercial activity at the airport. The traffic statistics are publicly 
available on the website of the airport owner Avinor (2013). The data set consists of annual 
observations of production and accounting figures for all 46 airports owned by Avinor for the years 
2007, 2008, and 2009. However, the heliport (purely a landing site for helicopters) at Værøy (VRY) 
has been omitted since its cost structure deviates somewhat from regular airports. Moreover, it 
should be noted that OSL is large compared to the other Norwegian airports and accounts for 40% of 
all airports’ costs and 30% of ATMs and is, thus, an extreme outlier for all variables.   
The two panel data dimensions relate to 1) an airport specific identifier and 2) the time period 
indicated by waves. The airport identifier is a unique number. The waves consider time periods of 
one year and the data set should be regarded as a short panel since it only includes three waves. The 
fact that this is a short panel makes it relevant to compare analyses of panel data models using 
ordinary regression on pooled data. All airports have reported the figures for all waves and this is 
consequently a balanced data set without missing values. Hence, the data set avoids survivorship 
bias and the loss of sample size (see e.g. Baum, 2006). Survivorship bias would not be a problem in 
this analysis because survival of the highly regulated airports in Norway is politically conditioned and 
uninfluenced by airport specific abilities. Moreover, the selection in the data set is a complete 
representation of the population since all Avinor airports are included. Consequently, three waves of 
45 airports make up a total of 135 observations. Descriptive statistics for the pooled data set are 
presented in Table 2.   
 
Table 2. Annual descriptive statistics for the airports (N=135). 
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Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Observations 
(Costs) 
Overall 7.27×107 2.19×108 1.04×107 1.54×109 N = 135 
n = 45 
T = 3 
Between  2.20×108 1.14×107 1.49×109 
Within  6316915 3.19×107 1.21×108 
(PAX) 
Overall 860410 2884354 5615 1.93×107 N = 135 
n = 45 
T = 3 
Between  2904934 6989 1.88×107 
Within  82483 124103 1369903 
(ATM) 
Overall 13625 33131 711 220514 N = 135 
n = 45 
T = 3 
Between  33357 870 211718 
Within  1258 3095 22422 
𝐷𝐷1  
(Category) 
Overall 0.40 0.49 0 1 N = 135 
n = 45 
T = 3 
Between  0.49 0 1 
Within  0 0.4 0.4 
𝐷𝐷2  
(Main airport, OSL) 
Overall 0.22 0.15 0 1 N = 135 
n = 45 
T = 3 
Between  0.15 0 1 
Within  0 0.22 0.22 
 
For all variables in Table 2 the within variation is considerably lower compared to the between 
variation indicating large differences between airports and relatively stable characteristics over the 
years. A comparison of the minimum and maximum values with the mean values indicates that the 
data set is “right skewed” with a few large airports. All metric variables in Table 2 are right skewed 
due to the presence of few airports with high traffic and many small airports with low traffic in the 
data set. The average airport in the data set has annual operating costs of NOK 72.7 million. If OSL is 
excluded, the average costs would decrease to about NOK 40 million. The number of terminal 
passengers, which includes counting passengers both on departure and arrival, is 860000. This makes 
the actual number of people travelling about 430000. The average number of air traffic movements 
is about 13600.  
Table 3. Correlation matrix.  
Variable 𝜕𝜕 𝑃𝑃1 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃2 𝐷𝐷1 𝐷𝐷2 
𝜕𝜕 (Costs) 1     
𝑃𝑃1 (PAX) .987* 1    
𝑃𝑃2 (lnATM) .625* .698* 1   
𝐷𝐷1 (Category) .306* .346* .570* 1  
𝐷𝐷2 (OSL) .981* .942* .487* .185* 1 
* Significantly correlated at 1% level (2-tailed). 
The matrix in Table 3 shows that correlations between the costs and the independent variables are 
very high. This can be expected keeping in mind earlier studies of this industry (e.g. Hakimov and 
Scholz, 2010). However, the correlation between PAX and ATM is considerably reduced by the 
transformation. Without transformation the correlation between PAX and ATM is 0.993.  
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4.2 Estimation Results 
Estimation results by applying the empirical data in the panel data cost function in equation (2) are 
presented in Table 4 along with the results from the pooled data model in equation (1). The 
proportion of variance explained, indicated by R2, is generally high and the F-test indicates a good 
model fit. All estimated parameters have signs in accordance with the a-priori assumptions and are 
significantly positive at 1% level (2-tailed).  
Further tests of the statistical properties of the pooled analysis indicate near extreme 
multicollinearity, with a mean VIF value of 12.6. This is an expected consequence of the close 
relationship existing between the independent variables presented in Table 3. This leads to high 
standard errors but is not a violation of OSL regression assumptions (e.g. Wooldridge, 2006). A study 
of the residuals shows a mean value of about 0 and a peaked distribution. The error term is not 
significantly correlated to any of the independent variables. Hence, the statistical properties are 
generally good and indicate that the estimation results from the OLS regression can be trusted.  
Table 4. Estimation results for pooled OLS and random effects (GLS) 
Variable 
Pooled OLS Random effects (GLS) 
Coefficient Std. dev. t-value Coefficient Std. dev. t-value 
𝛽𝛽0 Constant 2.06×107 1084468 19.0 1.98×107 1604496 12.3 
𝛽𝛽1 𝑃𝑃1 (PAX) 31.95 1.18 27.0 33.61 1.71 19.7 
𝛽𝛽2 𝑃𝑃2 (lnATM) 7234523 1178193 6.1 5974870 1709082 3.5 
𝛽𝛽3 𝐷𝐷1 (Category) 1.57×107 1667474 9.4 1.54×107 2493248 6.2 
𝛽𝛽4 𝐷𝐷2 (OSL) 8.26×108 1.90×107 43.5 8.01×108 2.75×107 29.1 
Rho N.A.  0.52   
R2 (Overall) 0.9988  0.9988   
 
Both pooled OLS and Random effects GLS returned quite similar coefficients for the estimated 
parameters. In the following the panel data estimates are used. The estimation in Table 4 indicates 
that the long-run marginal costs for handling an extra passenger (PAX) are NOK 34. According to the 
derivative presented in Section 2, the costs for an extra air traffic movement (ATM) amount to about 
NOK 439 and do not depend on the weight of the plane.10 Values must be doubled if only departures 
are charged. Fixed costs amount to about NOK 20 million per year, with an additional element of 
NOK 15.4 million if the airport qualifies for category 3 or 4. Finally, for the main airport OSL, the total 
costs shift positively to the extent of about NOK 80 million. In comparison, Mathisen et al. (2012), 
                                                          
10 If 𝛽𝛽2 = 5974870 (see Table 4) and mean 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 = 13625 (see Table 2), then 𝜕𝜕𝐶𝐶𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴 = 𝛽𝛽2𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴 ≈ 439. The use of 
average 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 is a simplification implying that airports with more (less) traffic will have a lower (higher) value. 
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using untransformed variables only and excluding OSL, estimated the coefficients for PAX and ATM to 
be NOK 27 and NOK 604, respectively. 
The fixed effects model (within-group) is not suited for this analysis since there is no variation over 
time for the dummy variables. Hence, 𝐷𝐷1 and 𝐷𝐷2 are excluded in the fixed effects analysis. The 
within-group estimation gives a correlation between the unobserved individual effects and the 
explanatory variables of 0.83. About half of the variation in operating costs is explained by the 
unobserved individual effects (rho) which can be properties such as quality and organisational 
structure. The random effects combination of between-group and within-group estimates give a 
median theta value of 0.515, thus lending some weight to the within estimator and indicating that 
the random effects method, using both within and between variations, will be optimal. However, 
some tests of the underlying assumptions must be carried out to determine whether the random 
effects model is appropriate.  
The correlation between the error term, 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡, and the explanatory variables is close to zero and not 
significant. Furthermore, the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier test, assessing whether random 
effects should be used instead of pooled data, strongly rejects the null hypothesis in favour of the 
random effects model. The Hausman test, checking whether regressors are uncorrelated with 
individual effects, satisfies the 5 % significance level and indicates that the random effects model is 
consistent and also provides the best unbiased estimates.  
 
5. Marginal Cost Based Charge Schemes  
The Norwegian Ministry of Transport and Communication has stated three main objectives for the 
revised charges for airports owned by Avinor. First, all requirements of the EU (2009) directive for 
airport charges must be met. Second, the new charges should to a larger extent than current charges 
be based on the principles of welfare economics. Finally, there are budget (revenue) restrictions 
stating that the new charging system should be revenue neutral. Additionally, it has been common 
practice that charges are equal for all airports throughout the country. This is regarded as fair since 
passengers in all parts of the country are treated equally. However, this condition must be relaxed if 
e.g. Ramsey pricing or peak-load pricing is to be implemented. Price differentiation between airports 
or between time periods is feasible, but this is ultimately a political decision and the principle of 
equality is strongly rooted in the Norwegian political system.  
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5.1 Charges Based on Marginal Costs Only 
Marginal costs (MC) derived by using the parameter values 𝛽𝛽1 = 33.61,𝛽𝛽2 = 5974870 and 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 =13625 are presented in relation to Table 4. These values are valid for both departure and arrival, 
implying that estimated values are multiplied by 2 if charged only once per trip. Hence, the marginal 
cost based airport charges imposed on the air transport companies increase by NOK 67 (NOK 33.6×2) 
for each passenger and by a fixed element of NOK 878 (NOK 439×2). Hence, the model specification 
implies that the ATM charge is the same for aircrafts of all sizes. However, the increased importance 
of the PAX element indirectly ensures a differentiation in charges according to plane size. For 
example, a 39 seat Dash 8-100 and a 189 seat Boeing 737-800 would have charges of NOK 2861 and 
NOK 10526, respectively, assuming here 80% capacity utilization.  
It should be noted that this ATM charge is based on the average traffic volume for all airports in the 
network. Due to the ln-specification in (1), the marginal cost based ATM charge will depend on the 
number of ATM. The derivative with respect to ATM implies that airports with high traffic should 
have a lower ATM charge with the opposite applying for smaller airports. Setting charges according 
to this rule would be problematic from a regional policy perspective, in that the airports with low 
traffic are usually located in rural areas where the airport is regarded as an important mainstay for 
continued settlement and further economic development.  
A comparison between these marginal cost charges and current charges shows that, on average for 
domestic and international flights, ATM charges are reduced from NOK 4296 to NOK 877 for an 
average aircraft and PAX charges are increased by NOK 21 (see average values in section 2.2). This 
corresponds to a reduction of 80% for ATM and an increase of 46% for PAX. Consequently, marginal 
cost pricing implies a significant transfer in taxation from ATM to PAX. This indicates that even 
though both elements should still be taxed, a considerable shift towards charging PAX should be 
implemented.  
Seen in isolation, marginal cost pricing following the estimates above will reduce revenues by NOK 
635 million. Hence, passengers will experience lower fares, thus stimulating increased demand for air 
transport. If we assume that 50% of the change in charges is transferred to the passengers11 and a 
price elasticity of -1.0, then an average ticket price will be reduced by NOK 18. If we assume the 
                                                          
11 To what extent a change in charges is passed on to passengers is discussed by Jørgensen and Santos (2011). 
They show that this proportion is always 50% in the case of linear curves under monopoly. However, for 
subsidized PSO routes the situation would depend on whether the authorities change the maximum fares 
accordingly and compensate the carrier. If reduced charges lead to an equal (or no) reduction in the regulated 
maximum fares, then all (or no) changes in charges will be transferred on to the passengers. On other 
discounted tickets, where prices are set freely in the market, it can be assumed that the normal market 
mechanism applies. 
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normal price to be NOK 1000, then the number of passengers will increase by about 1.8%. The 
increased number of passengers will not only impose an extra cost for the airports; they will also 
generate commercial revenues. Bearing in mind the increase in commercial revenues, the total 
revenue loss for Avinor is estimated at NOK 577 million.    
 
5.2 Adjustment to meet the Revenue Restriction 
A consequence of marginal cost pricing is that total revenues are reduced by about NOK 577 million 
compared to the current charge scheme for Norwegian airports. Several approaches can be chosen 
to meet the 2009 budget, or revenue, restriction. If total revenues generated from charges are kept 
at the same level, then the amount passed on from carriers to passengers can be assumed to equal 
those in the current charge scheme. Hence, for the purposes of simplicity, the number of PAX and 
ATM remains unchanged, as compared to that explained in Section 2.2. This is of course a debateable 
issue as a substantial amount of charges are charged on PAX instead of ATM; but we have no 
indications of the direction of any possible differentiations.  
A simple measure would be to raise all marginal costs elements by the same factor, relatively 
speaking, that is sufficiently high to match the revenues generated by the current charge scheme. 
Such an adjustment would raise the airport charges above the marginal cost by 43% to NOK 96 for 
PAX and NOK 1255 for ATM.  
Another well-recognized approach to meet revenue restrictions is to use the differences in air 
travellers’ price elasticity throughout the country using the Ramsey-rule. Ramsey-pricing has, to our 
knowledge, not been used at Norwegian airports, but charges could, in principle, be differentiated at 
airport level. The diversity in airport location from rural areas to large cities enables differentiation 
according to the presence of alternative transport for passengers. The price elasticity will be less 
negative (less price sensitive), if there are few alternative transport forms. Hence, such airports 
should have a higher rise in marginal costs than airports located in regions with many transport 
alternatives. However, in the same way as for differentiation of the ATM-charge according to traffic 
volume, Ramsey pricing according to these criteria could also be problematic from a regional policy 
perspective since the group with few alternatives (which would get the highest raise) is usually 
located in rural areas where the airport itself is regarded as an important means for further 
economic development. An example of the implementation of the Ramsey-rule at Norwegian 
airports according to these criteria is given by Jørgensen et al. (2011) accompanied by airport specific 
assumptions of elasticities and to what extent a change in charges is transferred on to passengers. 
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Following the assumptions made by Jørgensen et al. (2011), the charges vary from NOK 82 to NOK 
245 for PAX and NOK 1068 to NOK 3211 for ATM when using Ramsey pricing to meet the revenue 
restriction. However, if one considers that smaller airports rarely meet the capacity limit, then 
charges should be set according to short-run marginal costs. The fact that short-run estimates are 
lower than long-run estimates implies that the differences addressed above are reduced. This study 
addresses only long-run marginal costs, and we are thereby unable to carry out these calculations.  
  
5.3 Taking into Account the Costs of Raising Public Funds 
The deficit arising from marginal cost pricing must be financed by the state. Hence, it needs to be 
addressed whether the raising of public funds to finance revenue loss has any welfare economic 
consequences. The costs for general taxation have been studied empirically and The Norwegian 
Ministry of Finance (2005) has concluded that an add-on factor of 20% should be used as a rule. 
The welfare optimal charges, given that the loss of revenues must be financed by the state, can be 
derived by maximization of social surplus under budget constraint. When solving the Lagrange 
function, the expression for optimal price, P*, can be rephrased as in equation (3).  
(3)  𝑃𝑃∗ = 𝜕𝜕𝐶𝐶 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕⁄
1+
𝜏𝜏
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑋𝑋
 where 0 ≤ 𝜏𝜏 = 𝜆𝜆
1+𝜆𝜆
 
In (3) 𝑃𝑃∗ is optimal price, 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕/𝜕𝜕𝑃𝑃 denotes marginal costs, X is the demand for airport services, 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 
is the price elasticity and 𝜆𝜆 is the Lagrange multiplier. Since 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 has a negative value, it is required 
that |𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃| > 𝜏𝜏 to ensure that 𝑃𝑃∗ > 0. The factor 𝜆𝜆 represents the reduction in social surplus when 
the requirement for profit is increased by NOK 1. Hence, 𝜆𝜆 can be interpreted as the welfare loss 
occurring due to taxation. If 𝜆𝜆 = 0 then 𝜏𝜏 = 0 and the optimal charge will, according to (3), be equal 
to the marginal cost. A rephrasing of (3) can be made in order to show more clearly the adjustment 
factor, F, for marginal costs under the revenue restrictions presented in (4).  
(4)  𝑃𝑃∗ = 𝜕𝜕𝐶𝐶
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
 × 𝐹𝐹 where 𝐹𝐹 = 1
1+
𝜏𝜏
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑋𝑋
, 0 ≤ 𝜏𝜏 = 𝜆𝜆
1+𝜆𝜆
 and |𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃| > 𝜏𝜏 
It is evident from (4) that F increases when λ increases (higher taxation costs) and when |𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃| is 
reduced (lower price sensitivity). It can be derived from (4) that the value of F is 1.26, 1.20 and 1.16 
for price elasticities of -0.8, -1.0 and -1.2, respectively, given a welfare loss by taxation of 𝜆𝜆 = 0.2. 
Hence, assuming a price elasticity of -1.0 and The Norwegian Ministry of Finance (2005) 
recommendations of taxation costs, the optimal charges based on long-run marginal costs when 
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considering cost of raising public funds are NOK 80 for PAX and NOK 1054 for ATM. These charges 
make a loss for Avinor of about NOK 332 million. 
 
6. Conclusions and implications 
This article presents the results from a project initiated by the Norwegian Ministry of Transport and 
Communication aiming to derive airport charges more in line with the principles of welfare 
economics. A multiple regression model using panel data analysis is applied to derive marginal costs 
for passengers (PAX) and air traffic movements (ATM), these being the two main production 
measures at airports. The empirical data consists of accounting and production figures for all 46 
Norwegian publicly owned airports for the years 2007 to 2009.  
When disregarding the social cost of raising public funds, it is well recognized that marginal cost 
pricing produces the highest social surplus and is therefore desirable from the perspective of welfare 
economics. Under reasonable assumptions regarding travellers’ price elasticity and using the 
Ministry’s recommendations for the costs of raising public funds, airport charges should be raised by 
about 20% above marginal costs when aiming to maximize airports’ social surplus. If the charges aim 
to generate the same revenues as the current charge scheme, the values should be raised by an even 
higher factor.  
The derived values for the three different marginal cost based charge schemes discussed above are 
summarized in Table 5 along with the current charge scheme. For all marginal cost based charge 
schemes using raised values the adjustment factor is similar for PAX and ATM. This simplification is 
made because there is no empirical evidence of how the adjustment factor should be differentiated. 
Table 5 also shows the consequences of changing the charges for total revenues.       
Table 5. Charge schemes based on long-run marginal costs (MC) and current charges (NOK).  
 PAX ATM ∆Revenue 
Marginal cost (MC) pricing 67 877 -577 million 
MC pricing adjusted for welfare loss 80 1054 -332 million 
MC pricing adjusted to 2009 revenue 96 1255 0 
Average charges in 2009 46 4296 0 
 
Some changes can be suggested if using marginal cost based charges as compared to the current 
scheme. There should be a shift towards a relatively higher charge put on PAX compared to ATM. For 
example, if revenues are to be held at the 2009 level but based on marginal costs, the ATM charge is 
NOK 1255 compared to NOK 4296 based on the current charge scheme. This is in accordance with 
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IATA’s (2010) recommendations that, wherever possible and practical, airports should move over to 
passenger-based charges. The benefits are related to improved accountability for passengers and a 
lower risk for airline companies. In isolation, such a change will make a higher proportion of the 
carriers’ costs variable and, thereby, reduce the cabin factor required to establish new routes. 
Moreover, more emphasis on PAX charges ensures that larger and heavier aircraft are charged more 
greatly than small planes even though the ATM charge is independent of the maximum take-off 
weight (MTOW).  
A well-recognized means of meeting budget restrictions using marginal costs is to utilize the 
differences in price elasticity (Ramsey pricing). An application of this method implies imposing the 
highest adjustment factor on the regional airports where demand is inelastic due to few alternatives 
to air transport. This is not an acceptable solution from a regional policy perspective where airports 
are used as a means of maintaining settlement and providing economic development for rural areas. 
However, since there is considerable spare capacity at regional airports, it is reasonable that these 
charges should be set on the basis of short-run marginal costs. Based on such an argument, the 
charges set should be quite low. However, the use of Ramsey pricing and different marginal cost 
concepts is not possible in the current uniform charge system since this implies that the authorities 
would have to allow charges to vary between airports. 
Even though the data set contains objective information which is considered reliable, there is a 
potential for further improvements in the analysis should a more detailed data set be made 
available. This particularly applies to separating costs related to the inside area (e.g. terminal) and 
the airside area (e.g. runway system). Such data would enable us to run econometric regressions on 
inside costs using PAX as an independent variable and on airside costs using ATM as an independent 
variable. Analyses would then be even more accurate and multi-correlation problems could be 
avoided.  
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